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Abstract The economic globalization process has inte-
grated different competitive markets and pushes firms in
different countries to improve their managerial and oper-
ational efficiencies. Given the recent empirical evidence
for the benefits to firms and stakeholders of good corporate
governance (CG) practice, it is expected that good CG
practice would be a common strategy for firms in different
countries to meet the increasingly intense competition;
however, this is not the case. This study examines the
differences in CG practices in firms across different
countries using the concept of ethical sensitivity. Through
the regression analysis of 271 firms in 12 countries and
regions, it is found that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions can
explain the differences in CG practices. Furthermore, the
results demonstrate the influence of culture on ethical
sensitivity, which eventually determines the CG practices
in different regions.
Keywords Ethical sensitivity  Corporate governance 
Cultural dimensions  Emerging markets  Behavioral
finance
Corporate governance (CG) is a term that describes how
well corporate management works for shareholders. It has
been extended to describe the relationship between the
management and other stakeholders or corporate partici-
pants, including creditors, employees, customers, and
society in general (OECD 2004). Good CG practice means
that the corporate management has demonstrated its
responsibility to protect the interests of shareholders and
other stakeholders (e.g., lenders, customers, and employ-
ees), and promoted corporate fairness, transparency, and
accountability to its stakeholders.
Recent empirical research has documented the advan-
tages that accrue to firms and stakeholders from good CG
practices. Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), a
leading investment bank in the Asian markets, undertook a
comprehensive survey of the CG of corporations to mea-
sure corporate performance in emerging markets. The
CLSA (2001) report provided the details of this survey,
conducted on 495 firms, and the results showed that CG
had a significant influence on a corporation’s performance.
CLSA (2001) found that CG scores were positively related
to financial performance. Corporations with high CG
scores generally earned a higher return on equity. The
survey results indicated that corporations with good CG
were better able to manage and control expenses and were
more profitable. CLSA also found that corporations with
high CG scores performed better on the stock market and
provided higher than average returns to stockholders than
corporations with low CG scores. The findings of Gompers
et al. (2003) were similar to those of the CLSA report.
They found a close correlation between a corporation’s
stock performance and its CG score. They constructed a
CG index to measure the level of shareholder rights for
1,500 large corporations. The results showed that a high
return of 8.5% per annum could be earned simply by
investing in companies with a high CG index and selling
the shares of those with a low CG index. Gompers et al.
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(2003) also found that corporations with stronger share-
holder rights had, in general, higher firm values, higher
profitability, higher sales growth, and lower capital
expenditures.
The economic globalization process has integrated dif-
ferent competitive markets from around the world. Firms in
different countries have been pushed to improve their
managerial and operational efficiencies under the increas-
ingly competitive environment. Given the recent empirical
evidence for the benefits that accrue to firms and stake-
holders from good CG practice, it would be expected that
good CG practice should be a common strategy for firms in
different countries; however, this is not the case. There are
firms that do not follow good CG practice. Klapper and
Love (2004) investigated the effect of the legal system on
CG practice. They used the data from the CLSA (2001)
survey to study the CG of corporations in countries with
different legal systems. They found that in countries with
strong legal systems, firms usually had high CG scores.
They also investigated the effect of CG on corporate per-
formance and found that on the average, firms with better
CG had a better operating performance and a higher market
valuation; this relationship was even more significant for
corporations in countries with weak legal environments.
To investigate the determinants for CG development,
Doidge et al. (2007) developed a theoretical model based
on the implementation cost of CG practice. They found that
the characteristics of countries could explain the variation
in CG practices. Their theoretical model predicted that
firms would have very little incentive to improve CG if the
economic development of the country was below a
threshold level. Black et al. (2006b) also conducted an
empirical investigation into the determinants of CG
development, using a Korean dataset. They found that
some firm-specific factors (e.g., firm size, firm risk, and
profitability) could significantly explain the Korean cor-
porate governance index (KCGI) of different Korean firms.
Theoretical Foundation
Relationships Among CG, Ethical Sensitivity,
and Cultural Dimensions
Although CG practice and ethical sensitivity are highly
related, they are not exactly the same. A major reason for
the management to voluntarily maintain good CG practice
(such as to provide accountability and transparency of
internal operation to outside investors) is to lower the future
external financing cost. Doidge et al. (2007) provided a
theoretical model for the firm’s choice of CG practice by
analyzing the costs and benefits of implementing measures
to improve the CG structure and operational transparency.
Firms with a better CG structure can earn the trust of
external investors; hence, they can borrow money at a lower
borrowing cost and also issue new shares at a higher offer
price to investors. In other words, the major benefit of good
CG practice is to have a lower external funding cost. In view
of this economic benefit, an internal corporate manager with
low ethical sensitivity may have to adopt good CG practice
to attract funding from external investors at a lower cost.
Hence, good CG practice is not exactly the same as high
ethical sensitivity. However, in general, when holding other
variables constant, a corporate management team with
higher ethical sensitivity will implement better CG practice.
The underlying reasons are provided in the following
paragraphs.
CG describes how well the corporate management
works for the shareholders and other stakeholders. CG has
many ethical implications (Thomas 2004). According to
Rossouw (2005), ‘‘the way in which a company treats its
stakeholders reflects its ethical standards. It is therefore to
be expected that companies for whom ethics is a priority
will be sensitive to its stakeholders. This moral sensitivity
will be reflected in the identification of stakeholders as well
as in the manner in which they are being engaged by the
company’’ (p. 99).
Bonn and Fisher (2005) developed an approach to
integrate business ethical concerns into the CG structure of
an organization. It is important to know that the existence
of a code of ethical conduct is not sufficient to ensure the
practice of ethical behavior throughout organizations.
Furthermore, people should not view the code of ethics as
guidelines to be followed simply to please their bosses and
auditors. Instead, careful strategic planning is needed to
communicate CG to everyone in an organization, so that
they recognize the importance of the guidelines and prac-
tice good CG. For example, to ensure that employees
practice good CG, there should be extensive and frequent
discussions amongst people in the organizations, including
the board of directors, senior managers, middle managers,
and other employees. In addition to formal discussions of
CG, informal discussions about CG can help identify
potential gray areas and improve the quality of ethical
thinking. Moreover, there should be development and
training for staff so that CG is clearly understood by
everyone in the organizations. Eventually, employees will
be committed and dedicated to practicing good CG.
Implementation of a CG structure may sometimes create
conflicts between the directors and shareholders. One of the
possible conflicts is that some directors may be hesitant to
punish ineffective managers because of their close con-
nection. This hesitation is certainly not a good CG practice,
because shareholders’ interest will be badly affected if
ineffective managers continue to serve in the firms. How-
ever, Felo (2001) showed that when firms offer ethics
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programs to employees, the firms are less likely to have
conflicts within the CG structures. This is because ethics
programs can help directors and employees to recognize
ethical conflicts and find ways to resolve them within the
CG structure, so that they can smoothly implement good
CG practice. In other words, the better people recognize
ethical issues, the fewer ethical conflicts they have and the
better their CG practices.
Overall, good CG practice is not easy to maintain
because it requires well-designed ethics policies, ethical
leadership, and incorporating ethics into the organizational
processes and strategies. It is important to have an ethical
culture at all levels of the organization (Webley and
Werner 2008). Hence, based on the above studies, for
organizations to be considered as practicing good CG,
every employee in the organization must be aware of and
recognize the importance of complying with the ethical
code or guidelines. Interestingly, ethical sensitivity is
defined by Hebert et al. (1990) as ‘‘the ability to recognize
ethical issues’’ (p. 141). Shaub (1989) describes ethical
sensitivity as the ‘‘ability to recognize that a situation has
ethical content when it is encountered’’ (p. 7). In this study,
we considered employees’ ethical sensitivity as one of the
major elements in developing good CG practice.
Shaub et al. (1993) explained that an important factor in
people’s decision to perform ethical actions is their rec-
ognition of their role as moral agent. Furthermore, they
must have ethical sensitivity to recognize such a role and to
think about the consequences they can bring by acting
ethically. Orlitzky and Swanson (2010) considered execu-
tives as having ethical sensitivity when they are able to
lead their firms toward good corporate citizenship and
provide benefits to society, such as financial returns to
shareholders, fair employment standards for workers, etc.
Executives with ethical sensitivity must have both organi-
zational and societal responsibilities. The above-mentioned
forms of behavior are, in fact, some of the many good
practices of CG. Corporate management must have ethical
sensitivity to practice CG in a firm. Even if the ethical
criteria or good practices of CG are explicit and written
down, if individuals, especially those in the corporate
management team, are not aware of or ignore those ethical
criteria, then they are useless. Thus, the ethical sensitivity
of individuals plays a major role in whether good CG
practices are followed.
In terms of the relationship between cultural dimensions
and ethical sensitivity, Mintz (2006) suggested that the
cultural environment has a greater impact on people’s
ethical sensitivity than the enforcement of rules of conduct.
Fernando and Chowdhury (2010) also noted that an indi-
vidual’s cultural background has a great impact on ethical
sensitivity. Research on ethical sensitivity in the business
world is growing. Many studies have investigated the
relationship between culture and ethical sensitivity, and
some have examined it from a macro-perspective. For
example, Blodgett et al. (2001) found that cultural
dimensions had significant effects on ethical sensitivity.
This study compared the ethical sensitivity of people from
Taiwan and the United States towards the interests of
various stakeholders, in marketing situations. Stakeholders
included employers, customers, stockholders, creditors,
suppliers, colleagues, competitors, and other communities
or groups that might be affected by decisions involving
ethical issues. The results showed that ethical sensitivity
was influenced by culture.
Some studies have investigated the relationships
between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and ethical issues.
In fact, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions can be described in
terms of pairs of dimensions (Rawwas 2001). For example,
people from a culture with a small power distance index
(PDI) and weak uncertainty avoidance are known as
functionalists. People living in cultures with a high PDI and
strong uncertainty avoidance are called deferents. Survi-
vors are people from cultures with a weak PDI and strong
uncertainty avoidance, while enthusiasts are from cultures
with a strong PDI and weak uncertainty avoidance. Raw-
was (2001) found that these four types of people held
different perceptions on the appropriateness of behavior in
the marketplace. For example, deferents, who are charac-
terized as being very obedient to their own bosses’ rules
and long-range plans to avoid anxieties about the future,
were found to have stringent ethical beliefs.
In a study of 425 managers from 10 nations and 4
continents, Jackson (2001) found that the ethical attitudes
of managers were related to their national groups. The
study examined whether managers from different countries
would attach high or low ethical importance to their rela-
tions with external stakeholders, such as gift giving and
receiving. The results showed that managers from indi-
vidualistic and low uncertainty avoidance countries gave
higher ethical importance to relations with external stake-
holders, whereas managers from individualistic and high
uncertainty avoidance countries gave lower ethical
importance to the same issue. In terms of collectivism,
managers from collectivistic and high uncertainty avoid-
ance cultures placed high ethical importance on issues
involving relations with external stakeholders. On the other
hand, managers from collectivistic and low uncertainty
avoidance countries placed low ethical importance on this
issue.
Hwang et al.’s (2003) study suggested that people from
different cultures would handle business situations differ-
ently, and Husted and Allen (2008) studied the business
ethical decision-making process by comparing individual-
istic and collectivistic countries. Generally speaking, dif-
ferent cultures (e.g., individualistic and collectivist) affect
Cultural Dimensions, Ethical Sensitivity, and Corporate Governance
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people’s ‘‘perception of ethical dilemmas, moral reasoning,
and the behavior of individuals in organizations’’ (Husted
and Allen, p. 301).
Other studies have examined the relationship between
culture and ethical sensitivity from a micro-perspective.
For example, Chen et al. (1997) studied the impact of
corporate culture on ethical sensitivity and behavior. Patt-
erson (2001) found that industry environment, organiza-
tional environment, and personal experiences all
significantly affected the ethical sensitivity of auditors.
Based on the relationship between cultural dimensions
and ethical sensitivity, and the relationship between ethical
sensitivity and CG, this study investigated the variation in
CG practices across cultures, using the cultural dimensions
developed by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005): power dis-
tance index (PDI), individualism (IDV), masculinity
(MAS), uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), and long-term
orientation. This article omitted long-term orientation as an
independent variable, because the data collected by Hof-
stede (2001) for this variable were not as extensive as those
collected for the other four cultural dimensions (Hofstede
2001).
The hypotheses below were developed according to the
levels of ethical sensitivity of different cultures found in
previous studies (Armstrong 1996; Blodgett et al. 2001; Ho
and Lin 2008; Schepers 2006).
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions—PDI, IDV, MAS,
and UAI
The cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (2001), are
widely used in different areas of research for understanding
culture. Culture is defined by Hofstede (2001) as ‘‘the
collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the
members of one group or category of people from another’’
(p. 9). Cultural traits of nations are difficult to change; for
example, Chinese people have been guided by Confu-
cianism since approximately 500 B.C., when Kong Fu Ze
was teaching. This set of pragmatic rules is still affecting
the behavior of Chinese people today, even those who have
moved to other countries (Hofstede and Bond 1988). The
five cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede included
PDI, IDV, MAS, UAI, and long-term orientation.
Power is unequally distributed among the members of
high PDI societies, and less powerful people are afraid of
contradicting authorities. They must accept the fact that
power and benefits are unequally distributed, and that
power and benefits are controlled by a few powerful people
(Hofstede 1984). People in low PDI societies have more
control over their lives, and authorities in this culture are
willing to listen and accept different opinions from others
before making decisions, especially when those decisions
have a great impact on society.
People from high IDV societies are independent; they
focus on themselves and emphasize adherence to personal
norms and goals. People in low IDV societies, on the other
hand, emphasize the interdependence between themselves
and their group or community. They feel obliged to follow
social duties, expectations, roles, and other societal influ-
ences (Triandis 1995, 1996; Triandis et al. 1998).
Men and women are treated differently in high MAS
societies, and people in these societies are ego-oriented
(Hofstede 2001). People tend to be tough in such societies,
and men are encouraged to be assertive and ambitious.
They must be tougher than women, who should be tender
and caring. Generally speaking, people in high MAS
societies emphasize challenges, earnings, recognition, and
advancement (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005).
People in high UAI societies have low tolerance for
ambiguity, are relatively conservative, have a strong
desire to obey the existing social system and management
practice, and are afraid of foreign or external things. They
are afraid of uncertainty. People in low UAI ranking
countries are more willing to accept changes and take
greater risks, because they feel that they have more con-
trol over their lives, the authorities, and even the world
(Hofstede 1984).
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions help in understanding
culture differences, but they cannot describe the whole
culture. Also, the reliability and validity of these cultural
dimensions have been questioned by other researchers.
Smith et al. (1996) stated that Hofstede’s cultural dimen-
sions had significant correlations with geographic, eco-
nomic, and social indicators, and that the correlation
between IDV and economic development was strong.
Establishing correlations was a way of validating Hofst-
ede’s cultural dimensions. They also criticized the sample,
as Hofstede collected data from respondents who all worked
in the same corporate culture. Therefore, the respondents
might not be representative of the broader national popu-
lation. However, they concluded that the reliability and
durability of these cultural dimensions could be seen by
‘‘the extent that similar patterns of findings emerge from
different types of samples, different time periods, and
measures from different domains of social behaviors’’
(Smith et al. 1996, p. 234).
Moreover, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were corre-
lated with Chinese Culture Connection (CCC) factors and
it was found that PDI and IDV were significantly and
moderately correlated with the CCC variables of integra-
tion and moral discipline. A strong correlation was found
between MAS and the human heartedness factor of CCC.
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were also significantly
correlated with Schwatz’s value types. These correlations
of cultural dimensions with other factors are convincing
and are not coincidental as the data for the CCC factors and
A. W. H. Chan, H. Y. Cheung
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Schwatz’s value types were collected from different cul-
tures and with different types of samples.
Hypothesis Development
Blodgett et al. (2001) found that a lower PDI was related to
an increase in ethical sensitivity in business transactions
toward stakeholders, such as customers, competitors, and
colleagues. Those who make important business decisions
in high PDI cultures are usually powerful and wealthy, and
consider their own interests to be more important than
those of other stakeholders (Blodgett et al. 2001; Hofstede
2001). Such individuals believe that they are entitled to
more privileges than ordinary people. However, as dis-
cussed above, good CG practices and ethical sensitivity are
positively related, and CG generally protects the interests
of every stakeholder, not just the powerful decision makers
in corporations. Therefore, individuals in low PDI cultures
have higher ethical sensitivity, because they believe that
everyone should be treated fairly and that benefits should
be equally distributed. Individuals in low PDI cultures act
on their beliefs and perform more ethical behaviors (Hof-
stede and Hofstede 2005). Based on the negative rela-
tionship between low PDI and ethical sensitivity and the
positive relationship between ethical sensitivity and CG,
the following hypothesis is developed.
Hypothesis 1 The quality of CG is higher in low PDI
cultures.
Simga-Mugan et al. (2005) showed that when compared
with managers from Turkey, a country which scored low in
Hofstede’s IDV dimension, managers from the United
States were found to have higher ethical sensitivity, due to
their country’s high IDV score. In fact, the positive rela-
tionship between ethical sensitivity and IDV can be seen in
different studies (Cohen et al. 1996; Smith and Hume
2005). Franke and Nadler (2008) demonstrated that people
in low IDV cultures would favor in-groups at the expense
of out-groups, leading to ethical insensitivity especially
when the unethical acts benefited the in-groups. In contrast,
the ethical attitudes of people from high IDV cultures
reflect ‘‘an assertive self-orientation that limits confor-
mity’’ (Franke and Nadler 2008, p. 256). Moreover, Hof-
stede (2001) described people from high IDV cultures as
placing high emphasis on individual rights and fair treat-
ment, and thus they are highly aware of the unethical
behavior of others and themselves. When the relationships
between IDV and ethical sensitivity and between ethical
sensitivity and CG are positive, the following hypothesis is
developed.
Hypothesis 2 The quality of CG is higher in high IDV
cultures.
Blodgett et al. (2001) found that MAS and ethical sen-
sitivity were negatively related. MAS societies are char-
acterized as money oriented, materialistic, aggressive,
ambitious, competitive, and greedy, and people in high
MAS cultures have less concerned for the interests of other
people. This makes corporate management less concerned
with the interests and benefits of their customers, com-
petitors, and colleagues in the firms (Blodgett et al. 2001;
Hofstede 2001). Vitell and Festervand (1987) found that
the characteristics of people in high MAS cultures were the
greatest contributors to unethical practices and ethical
insensitivity, especially in business, because people sought
financial gains. Lending and Slaughter (1999) also found
that these people were less sensitive to organizational
values. Overall, people who have low ethical sensitivity
and disregard organizational values will have difficulty
empathizing with other people and creating a fair business
environment. Based on the ethical insensitivity of people in
MAS cultures and the positive relationship between ethical
sensitivity and CG, the following hypothesis is developed.
Hypothesis 3 The quality of CG is higher in low MAS
cultures.
A number of studies have investigated the relationship
between UAI culture and ethical sensitivity. High UAI
culture is more compatible with formal rules and regula-
tions. People with high UAI are more intolerant of any
deviation from formal rules, regulations, and organiza-
tional norms (see Vitell et al. 1993; Blodgett et al. 2001;
Weaver 2001). Vitell et al. (1993, p. 757) stated the
proposition that ‘‘[b]usiness practitioners in countries that
are high in uncertainty avoidance (i.e., Japan) will be more
likely to consider formal professional, industry and orga-
nizational codes of ethics’’.
In contrast, when there is no formal rule or regulation to
govern a business decision, it is less likely that a high UAI
manager will recognize the ethical issue in a business
decision. Vitell et al. (1993, p. 757) further stated the
proposition that ‘‘[b]usiness practitioners in countries that
are high in uncertainty avoidance (i.e. Japan) will be less
likely to perceive ethical problems’’. The absence of formal
laws and regulations for certain business decisions gener-
ates an ambiguous working environment, which provides
more flexibility but also uncertainty to the management,
and in turn makes the ethics management in high UAI
culture more problematic. Weaver’s (2001) study also
noted that people in high UAI societies would have prob-
lems with ethics management conducted through anony-
mous reporting systems and informal cues, as such ethics
rules would be perceived as ambiguous or unknown in their
Cultural Dimensions, Ethical Sensitivity, and Corporate Governance
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working environments. Following similar arguments, Hu-
sted (2000) stated that in the absence of formal rules and
laws, anxiety over ambiguous and uncertain situations
would make high UAI managers less likely to recognize
their decision as an ethical issue, and hypothesized a higher
rate of software piracy in higher UAI cultures.
In general, CG practice is not formally stated as laws or
regulations in countries, except for a few examples of
investor protection laws, such as laws against insider
trading. Standards for good CG practice are usually
guidelines and recommendations. They are neither formal
legal regulations nor binding agreements between the
internal management and external stakeholders. No country
formally stipulates or legally enforces that corporate
management must do their best for shareholders and other
stakeholders. The standard of good CG practice is basically
a set of informal guidelines. This leads to a certain degree
of ambiguity over how to manage the firm, and generates
uncertainty in the management team. Following the above
arguments, the absence of formal rules or regulations
governing a business decision will make a high UAI
manager less likely to recognize the ethical issue in a
business decision. From the perspective of internal man-
agement, reluctance to make the internal operation more
transparent and to provide better accountability to outside
stakeholders can greatly reduce the ambiguity of the
management environment and the uncertainty of future
outcomes. Hence, the management in high UAI culture is
less likely to voluntarily practice good CG to avoid the
uncertainty of outcomes. Based on the above studies, the
following hypothesis is developed.
Hypothesis 4 The quality of CG is higher in low UAI
cultures.
Method
CG Measure
The CG score data were obtained from a comprehensive
survey carried out by CLSA, a leading investment bank in
the Asian markets. The results of this survey are presented
in a detailed 224-page report (CLSA 2001). Many
researchers have successfully used the CLSA survey
dataset to investigate different aspects of the impact of CG.
For example, using these data, Klapper and Love (2004)
investigated the relationship between CG development and
the legal systems among different emerging markets.
Durnev and Kim (2005) examined why some companies
could develop better CG practices than those required by
law. They predicted that companies with greater growth
opportunities, greater needs for external financing, and
more concentrated cash flow would have higher quality CG
practices and would also disclose more information to the
public. The CLSA data provided empirical evidence to
support these predictions. Khanna et al. (2006) examined
the relationship between globalization and similarities in
CG through a cross-country analysis using CLSA data.
CLSA measured the CG practices of corporations in
emerging markets over a 6-week period ending in March
2001. Emerging markets are newly developed or devel-
oping financial markets, which usually have a short oper-
ating history, smaller market capitalization, and lower
trading volumes. As they are still in the process of devel-
opment, their rules and regulations and CG structure are
not completely mature. The survey covered 495 listed
companies from 25 emerging markets and 18 industrial
sectors. The questionnaires were completed by CLSA’s
financial analysts in each country of the companies cov-
ered. Their answers were based on each company’s pub-
lications and on interviews with management and they
rated the companies on 57 issues. The issues were grouped
into seven CG factors: discipline, transparency, indepen-
dence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social
awareness. For each company, each CG factor was given a
different percentage of importance to generate a weighted
CG score (CLSA 2001). Table 1 provides the detailed
information about the seven CG factors.
Macroeconomic Factors
The economic development and wealth level of a country
are expected to be related to its level of CG development.
The theoretical model from Doidge et al. (2007) predicts
that economic development is an important determinant for
CG development. Nicolo` et al. (2008) investigated the real
impact of CG on the growth and productivity of the
economy. They found a positive relationship between the
impact of improvements in CG quality and real economic
activity. To take into account these macroeconomic factors,
this study used the following control variables to indicate
the differences in economic development among the
investigated countries.
Log(GDP Per Capita)
A country’s wealth level can affect its CG development.
This study used the natural logarithm of gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita (in US$) as the control variable
for the wealth of a country. This study used the logarithm
of GDP per capita (in US$) in 2000 as a measure of the
wealth level of each country for analysis. The GDP per
capita (in US$) in 2000 data were obtained from The
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001 (IMD 2001);
however, the yearbook did not include the data for
A. W. H. Chan, H. Y. Cheung
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Pakistan. Instead, the GDP per capita for Pakistan (in US$)
in 2000 was obtained from the National Accounts Statistics
database from the United Nations (source: http://unstats.
un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp).
GDP Growth Rate
We controlled for the impact of macroeconomic conditions
on the development of CG practice by taking the average
annual growth rate of GDP as a control variable in our
analysis. The average annual GDP growth rates of different
countries were collected between 1990 and 2000 from the
World Development Indicator (World Bank 2006,
pp. 195–197). As the data for Taiwan’s GDP growth rate
was not available from this source, this study collected
Taiwan’s historical GDP growth rate from the official
website of the Department of Investment Services, Minis-
try of Economic Affairs, Taiwan (source: http://
investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/en/env/stats/gdp_growth.html).
Legal-Origin Factor
Company law and commercial code are basically devel-
oped from two legal traditions: the common-law tradition
and the civil-law tradition. La Porta et al. (1998) found that
in general, countries under common-law systems provided
Table 1 Criteria of Individual CG Factors in CG Survey of Credit
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA)
I. Discipline (15%)
a. Explicit public statement placing priority on CG
b. Management incentivised towards a higher share price
c. Sticking to clearly defined core businesses
d. Having an appropriate estimate of cost of equity
e. Having an appropriate estimate of cost of capital
f. Conservatism in issuance of equity or dilutive instruments
g. Ensuring debt is manageable, used only for projects with
adequate returns
h. Returning excess cash to shareholders
i. Discussion in Annual Report on CG
II. Transparency (15%)
a. Disclosure of financial targets, e.g., 3- and 5-year ROA/ROE
b. Timely release of Annual Report
c. Timely release of semi-annual financial announcements
d. Timely release of quarterly results
e. Prompt disclosure of results with no leakage ahead of
announcement
f. Clear and informative results disclosure
g. Accounts presented according to IGAAP
h. Prompt disclosure of market-sensitive information
i. Accessibility of investors to senior management
j. Website where announcements update promptly
III. Independence (15%)
a. Board and senior management treatment of shareholders
b. Chairman who is independent from management
c. Executive management committee comprised differently from the
board
d. Audit committee chaired by independent director
e. Remuneration committee chaired by independent director
f. Nominating committee chaired by independent director
g. External auditors unrelated to the company
h. No representatives of banks or other large creditors on the board
IV. Accountability (15%)
a. Board plays a supervisory rather than executive role
b. Non-executive directors demonstrably independent
c. Independent, non-executive directors at least half of the board
d. Foreign nationals presence on the board
e. Full board meetings at least every quarter
f. Board members able to exercise effective scrutiny
g. Audit committee that nominates and reviews work of external
auditors
h. Audit committee that supervises internal audit and accounting
procedures
V. Responsibility (15%)
a. Acting effectively against individuals who have transgressed
b. Record on taking measures in cases of mismanagement
c. Measures to protect minority interests
d. Mechanisms to allow punishment of executive/management
committee
Table 1 continued
e. Share trade by board members fair and fully transparent
f. Board small enough to be efficient and effective
VI. Fairness (15%)
a. Majority shareholders treatment of minority shareholders
b. All equity holders having right to call general meetings
c. Voting methods easily accessible (e.g., through proxy voting)
d. Quality of information provided for general meetings
e. Guiding market expectations on fundamentals
f. Issuance of ADRs or placement of shares fair to all shareholders
g. Controlling shareholder group owning less than 40% of company
h. Priority given to investor relations
i. Total board remuneration rising no faster than net profits
VII. Social awareness (10%)
a. Explicit policy emphasizing strict ethical behavior
b. Not employing the under-aged
c. Explicit equal employment policy
d. Adherence to specified industry guidelines on sourcing of
materials
e. Explicit policy on environmental responsibility
f. Abstaining from countries where leaders lack legitimacy
The information is obtained from pages 9–10 of ‘‘Saints and Sinners:
Who’s got religion’’, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia Research
Report, April 2001
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stronger legal protection for investors than countries under
civil-law systems. Hence, it is expected that countries
under common-law systems will have better CG practices
than countries under civil-law systems. To control for this
legal environment effect, we used the following control
variable for the legal system.
Common-Law Dummy
This common-law dummy variable was set to be ‘1’ if the
company law or the commercial code of the country
originated from a common-law system, and ‘0’ if it origi-
nated from a civil-law system. Our sample companies came
from only twelve countries/regions, including seven
countries with English common-law origins and five
countries with civil-law origins. Due to the small number
of countries of civil-law origin in our sample, we did not
make any further classification into French, German, or
Scandinavian civil law.
Firm-Specific Financial Factors
As Black et al. (2006b) empirically found that some firm-
specific factors (including firm size, firm risk, and profit-
ability) significantly explained CG for Korean firms, we
also considered the following firm-specific financial factors
as control variables in our analysis of the relationship
between cultural dimensions and CG scores.
Firm Size
Firm size is a proxy for the information availability of a
firm, because there are more analyst reports available for
large firms. Most financial analysts concentrate on ana-
lyzing large companies in the market, so large firms
become more transparent and are better monitored than
small firms. Hence, it is expected that larger firms will have
better CG. The market value of a firm is defined as the
number of outstanding shares multiplied by the stock
market price. The market value (in US$ million) at the end
of 2000 for each firm was collected from the database of
Thomas Reuters Datastream to measure the firm size of
each observation. This study took the natural logarithm of
the market value of the firm, Log(Market Value), as a
control variable for this firm size effect.
Market-to-Book Ratio
A market value ratio of a firm measures the market price of
its stock relative to the intrinsic value of the firm. A great
deal of empirical research has been conducted to examine
the relationship between CG and the market value ratios.
For example, Black et al. (2006a) found significant positive
relationships between the CG indexes of 515 Korean
companies and their market value ratios (Tobin’s q, mar-
ket-to-book, and market-to-sales). Similarly, Garay and
Gonza´lez (2008) found significant positive relationships
between the CG indexes of 46 Venezuelan firms and their
market value ratios (Tobin’s q and market-to-book). In this
study, the market-to-book ratio at the end of 2000 was
collected for each firm from the database of Thomas
Reuters Datastream to measure the ratio between the
market price per share and the accounting book value per
share.
Dividend Yield
The agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976) is the
conflict of interest between corporate managers (insiders)
and shareholders (outsiders); that is, corporate managers
may not maximize the value of the firm for the benefit of
the shareholders. One example of the agency problem is
the free cash flow problem (Jensen 1986), in which cor-
porate managers with excess cash holdings choose to invest
that cash in poorly performing projects rather than to return
the profit to shareholders through cash dividend distribu-
tion. Agency theory (Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984) holds
that the dividend policy can be used to reduce manage-
ment’s agency cost. As the dividend policy can align the
interests of managers with those of shareholders, it is
predicted that the dividend yield would be related to CG,
and therefore this study used dividend yield as a control
variable. This yield is defined as the annual cash dividend
per share over the stock market price. We collected the
dividend yield data at the end of 2000 for each firm from
the Thomas Reuters Datastream database.
We attempted to use as many observations as possible
from CLSA’s CG report for our analysis; however, some
observations were excluded. As the CG report of CLSA
provided only abbreviated company names, we excluded
those observations with ambiguous company names. After
merging different datasets, we excluded those observations
with any missing data for the macroeconomic variables,
legal-origin variables, firm-specific financial variables, and
cultural dimension variables that were required for our
analysis. Furthermore, to ensure that this study had suffi-
cient samples from each country under investigation, only
those countries with at least 10 valid firm observations
were considered.
After combining the CG survey data of CLSA with the
datasets of macroeconomic variables, legal-origin vari-
ables, firm-specific financial variables, and Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions, there were 271 complete observations
across the following 12 countries and regions (the number
of observations for each region are stated in parentheses):
Hong Kong (29), India (47), Indonesia (17), Malaysia (34),
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Pakistan (11), Philippines (14), Singapore (30), South
Africa (19), South Korea (14), Taiwan (28), Thailand (13),
and Turkey (15).
The data from CLSA and Hofstede’s cultural dimen-
sions were used to test the four hypotheses developed in
‘‘Theoretical foundation’’ section. Table 2 presents the
means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients
among the variables.
Results
Table 2 presents the correlation results among the vari-
ables. There were significant correlations between the CG
scores and the control variables. CG scores were signifi-
cantly and positively correlated with the five control vari-
ables, including Log(GDP per capita) with r = 0.27, GDP
growth rate with r = 0.15, common-law dummy with
r = 0.43, Log(MV) with r = 0.28, and market-to-book
ratio with r = 0.27. These results justified our consider-
ation of those control variables in this analysis.
Table 3 shows the results of the multiple regression
analysis. In Model 1, all six control variables were entered
into the model. Log(GDP per capita), common-law
dummy, Log(Market Value), and market-to-book ratio
were found to be statistically significant. Model 1 could
predict 37% of the total variance in the CG score, and the
slopes for the four variables in the model were all positive,
which is consistent with our earlier discussion. The four
cultural dimensions were entered into Model 2, and were
also found to be significant. PDI, IDV, MAS, and UAI
were able to predict 29% of the total variance in the CG
scores. Model 2 was statistically significant at 1%, indi-
cating that cultural dimensions could significantly explain
the difference in CG practices among firms.
The six control variables and the four cultural dimen-
sions were entered into Model 3, and they were able to
predict 45% of the total variance in the CG scores. The
slopes for Log(GDP per capita), common-law dummy,
market-to-book ratio, and IDV were significantly positive,
whereas those for MAS and UAI were significantly nega-
tive. Finally, the backward elimination method was
applied, with the statistical significance level set at 10%,
for the explanatory variables in Model 3 to generate the
final model, Model 4. In Model 4, the six variables,
including Log(GDP per capita), common-law dummy,
market-to-book ratio, IDV, MAS, and UAI, were able to
predict 45% of the total variance in the CG score. The
slopes for Log(GDP per capita), common-law dummy,
market-to-book ratio, and IDV were significantly positive,
whereas those for MAS and UAI were significantly
negative.
Discussion
The results of this study provide empirical evidence to
support the hypotheses that high IDV, low UAI, and low
MAS cultures have higher CG scores. However, the
empirical data did not show a significant relationship
Table 2 Means, standard deviations, correlations for dependent and independent variables
Variables Mean SD Correlations
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k)
(a) CG score 55.21 14.38 –
(b) Log(GDP
per capita)
8.12 1.49 0.27** –
(c) GDP
growth rate
5.31 1.62 0.15* 0.26** –
(d) Common-
law dummy
0.68 0.47 0.43** -0.04 0.17** –
(e) Log(MV) 6.95 1.39 0.28** 0.41** -0.02 -0.02 –
(f) Market-to-
book ratio
2.71 3.58 0.27** -0.15* 0.05 0.05 0.20** –
(g) Dividend
yield
2.52 2.90 -0.02 -0.12* -0.02 0.24** -0.18** -0.15* –
(h) PDI 73.10 15.60 -0.02 -0.21** 0.45** 0.17** -0.18** 0.01 0.05 –
(i) IDV 29.83 14.75 0.28** -0.44** -0.35** 0.35** 0.04 0.18** 0.08 -0.09 –
(j) MAS 50.82 7.55 0.22** -0.23** -0.35** 0.33** 0.08 0.13* 0.10 0.14* 0.67** –
(k) UAI 46.30 21.65 -0.40** -0.21** -0.39** -0.64** -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.44** -0.07 -0.42** –
N = 271 observations
* p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01
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between PDI cultures and CG scores after the consideration
of the control variables and other cultural dimensions. IDV,
MAS, UAI, and three control variables (Log(GDP per
capita), common-law dummy, and market-to-book ratio)
were able to predict 45% of the total variance in the CG
scores. The following sections will discuss the significant
predictive power of IDV, MAS, and UAI for CG scores,
based on the concept of ethical sensitivity. Moreover, one
section will discuss the insignificance of PDI on CG scores,
given the other control variables.
IDV Cultures and CG Scores
The empirical result showed that IDV significantly and
positively predicted CG scores, and this result is consistent
with Hypothesis 2. Armstrong’s (1996) findings suggested
that IDV and ethical sensitivity were positively correlated,
with leaders and employees in IDV cultures being more
aware and sensitive to ethical standards. Chan and Cheung
(2008) mentioned that investors in high IDV cultures
emphasized individual view and fair treatment from firms.
The stakeholders in high IDV countries will closely mon-
itor, and are very sensitive to, whether the firms that they
invested in are protecting their rights and benefits by
strictly following CG. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005)
described people in high IDV cultures as preferring reward
allocation based on equity for all and believing that rights
are supposed to be the same for all. Ensuring that firms
follow CG practices is one way to achieve the above
preferences and beliefs. The ethical sensitivity of people in
high IDV cultures actually pressures corporate manage-
ment to follow CG practices. Husted’s (2000) study also
showed that an increase in economic development was
related to fewer cases of software piracy across countries,
and that high IDV score and ethical sensitivity helped
lower the number of unethical acts. Similarly, high IDV
scores, ethical sensitivity, and CG scores are beneficial to
the overall economic development of countries.
MAS Cultures and CG Scores
The results of this study also showed that MAS signifi-
cantly and negatively predicted CG scores. Consistent with
Hypothesis 3, the CG scores were high in low MAS cul-
tures. In other words, high MAS cultures were found to
have lower quality of CG. As discussed above, Blodgett
et al. (2001) found that people in high MAS societies
showed less ethical sensitivity. Lu et al. (1999) found that
people in high MAS cultures were less likely to be influ-
enced by formal codes of ethics and less likely to adopt
deontological ethics (described as duty- or obligation-
based ethics). This is because individuals in these cultures
are very concerned with personal achievement and material
success, and often have a low sense of responsibility; thus,
they are likely to value their own interests more highly than
those of others (Hofstede 2001). Generally speaking, MAS
cultures are the opposite of feminine cultures, in which
people are described as compassionate, understanding, and
empathetic toward others, and as having stronger ethical
sensitivity (Nadler 2002).
Table 3 Regression analysis
results for corporate governance
score with explanatory variables
of macroeconomic variables,
firm-specific variables and
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
Note: Standardized regression
coefficients (betas) are reported
in this table
a Model 4 is the result from the
backward elimination method
with the statistical significance
level set at 10% for the
explanatory variables in Model
3
* p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01
Variables Dependent variable: CG Score
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a
Control variables
Log(GDP per capita) 0.28** 0.40** 0.43**
GDP growth rate -0.01 0.01
Common-law dummy 0.44** 0.19** 0.18**
Log(Market Value) 0.12* 0.05
Market-to-book ratio 0.26** 0.24** 0.26**
Dividend yield -0.03 -0.01
Independent variables
Power distance index (PDI) -0.20** 0.00
Individualism (IDV) 0.40** 0.46** 0.47**
Masculinity (MAS) -0.27** -0.19* -0.19*
Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) -0.57** -0.23* -0.23**
R2 0.37 0.29 0.45 0.45
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.28 0.43 0.44
df (regression, residual) (6, 264) (4, 266) (10, 260) (6, 264)
F 25.47** 26.79** 21.41** 35.92**
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Good CG practice means that the internal corporate
management provides better accountability to external
stakeholders and offers better protection of their interests.
Higher accountability and more transparency to external
stakeholders give the internal corporate management less
opportunity to gain personal benefits from the operation of
the firm. As people in high MAS cultures value personal
achievement and material success, managers in such cul-
tures are less likely to follow good CG practice to protect
the interests of external stakeholders. Rather, managers in
high MAS cultures are more likely to have their own set of
corporate management practices so as to achieve their
personal benefits. Studies have found the incidence of
corruption to be higher in high MAS cultures, and that
people from these cultures are likely to overlook ethically
questionable business practices (Cohen et al. 1992; Getz
and Volkamam 2001; Moon and Franke 2000). The char-
acteristics of people in high MAS cultures lead to a low
degree of ethical sensitivity; thus, it is difficult for firms in
such cultures to achieve high CG scores.
UAI Cultures and CG Scores
UAI was found to be significantly and negatively related to
CG scores across cultures, and this result is consistent with
Hypothesis 4. As noted, good CG practice is a set of
guidelines, not a set of formal laws and regulations that
business practitioners must follow. These CG guidelines
are suggestions for the internal management on how to run
a company with better accountability to external stake-
holders. Existing literature (Vitell et al. 1993; Husted 2000;
Weaver 2001) indicated that individuals in high UAI cul-
tures were highly compliant with formal rules and laws
guiding their ethical behaviors and they avoided deviation.
However, when there is no formal law or regulation gov-
erning a business decision, a high UAI manager is less
likely to recognize the ethical issue in the business deci-
sion. Schepers (2006) also noted that higher UAI cultures
were associated with higher ethical perception and rea-
soning. However, the study further explained that people in
high UAI cultures were ethnocentric and loyal to the
demands of in-group members. Thus, these people may
only be sensitive to ethics set by themselves or in-group
members, but it would be difficult for them to follow a set
of ethical guidelines, which are developed for the interests
of out-group members. The guidelines for good CG prac-
tice can be viewed as a set of requirements or constraints
for the internal management to provide better account-
ability to external stakeholders. However, the internal
corporate management in high UAI cultures may not view
the external stakeholders as in-group members. Thus, they
may not be ethically sensitive to the guidelines for good
CG practices. In other words, high UAI cultures have high
ethical sensitivity to formal laws and regulations; however,
these ethical rules are seen as more applicable to the in-
group members. On the other hand, as good CG practice is
a set of informal guidelines (not legally binding rules and
regulations), and are developed for the interests of external
stakeholders (out-group members), it explains the low CG
scores found in high UAI cultures.
Additionally, uncertainty avoidance is a problem-solv-
ing method that is a superficial and short-term strategy
(Schepers 2006). People using this strategy are merely
trying to control and reduce future uncertainty through an
immediate (but perhaps not the best) solution to current
problems. Implementing any new policy to improve CG
practice will induce uncertainty of future outcomes to the
management team; furthermore, it takes some time for
them to realize the benefits. People from high UAI cultures
may feel uncomfortable adopting any new management
practices when their ‘own’ ethical codes, which are bene-
ficial to in-group members, have been applied for so long.
PDI Cultures and CG Scores
PDI was statistically significant in explaining CG scores in
Model 2, along with the other three cultural dimensions of
IDV, MAS, and UAI. However, when control variables
were incorporated in Models 3 and 4, PDI became statis-
tically insignificant. We interpreted this change as a result
of the significant negative relationship between PDI and
Log(GDP per capita), which captured the explanatory
power of PDI on CG score and made PDI statistically
insignificant. To confirm this interpretation, we removed
the variable of Log(GDP per capital) from Models 3 and 4
and found that PDI became negatively significant again.
Furthermore, PDI remained statistically insignificant if we
removed any other control variables from Models 3 and 4.
Conclusions and Limitations
The results showed that IDV, MAS, UAI, and the three
control variables, including Log(GDP per capita), com-
mon-law dummy, and market-to-book ratio, had significant
explanatory power in predicting CG scores for firms across
different countries. Previous studies focused on economic
factors and the legal systems to explain CG development;
however, this study demonstrated that cultural factors also
play an important role after economic factors and legal
factors were controlled. As the ethical sensitivity of indi-
viduals is a more fundamental factor determining the
effectiveness of the implementation of any legal system,
and different cultures have different ethical values, it is
important for researchers to continue to investigate the
development of CG practices from the cultural perspective.
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Generally speaking, people from different cultures will
have different levels of ethical sensitivity and their levels
of ethical sensitivity are influenced by the values and
beliefs that are socialized by people in their cultures. In
fact, we should try to understand others who have different
levels of ethical sensitivity than us because they have been
brought up in such a way. When discussing CG, continuous
patience, education and negotiation are needed to show
people who hold low ethical sensitivity to CG that inap-
propriate ethical sensitivity and perception in doing busi-
nesses is harmful to society. At the same time, in cultures
where people have lower ethical sensitivity to CG, closer
observation may be needed to ensure that they are fol-
lowing the appropriate ethical guidelines.
One important limitation of this research was a conse-
quence of our CG dataset. There were only 271 observa-
tions from 12 countries and regions in this study. More
company observations from different regions would give a
more comprehensive analysis of how the firm-specific
factors determine the differences in CG practice, after the
factors of economic and regulatory environment are con-
trolled. Moreover, the company observations were from
emerging financial markets. The empirical results would be
more interesting if the company observations from the
developed financial markets were also included. Another
limitation of this study was the age of the CG data, which
was obtained from CLSA (2001), as more recent CG data
were not available. First, as the more recent reports of ‘CG
Watch’ from CLSA only provided the overall CG scores
for individual countries (not for individual firms), the latest
firm-level CG data were not available for our investigation.
Second, recent CG studies by CLSA covered only limited
financial markets. For example, CLSA (2001) provided the
survey data for individual firms in 25 countries/regions;
however, CLSA (2010) only provided the overall market
CG scores for 11 countries/regions. South Africa and
Pakistan, included in our analysis, were not covered in
CLSA (2010). Hence, we could not obtain more recent CG
data to analyze the variation in CG practices for the 271
samples in this study, over the past 10 years. To understand
if there were any major changes in the CG practice across
countries over the past 10 years, we present two summaries
for CG scores from CLSA (2001) and CLSA (2010).
Table 4 presents the country macro CG score for each
country in our analysis, which was calculated from five
macro determinants or market factors of CG practice for
each country; Table 5 presents the average firm-level CG
score for each country in our analysis, which was calcu-
lated from the average of CG scores for firms covered by
the CLSA survey. As CLSA had changed both the survey
questions and the CG score calculation method over the
last 10 years, it may not be appropriate to make any direct
comparison between the absolute CG scores from the two
reports. Instead, we compared the country rankings of CG
performance in the two periods. Although there were some
differences in the ranking in the two periods—for example,
Thailand demonstrated an improvement in CG practice—
on the whole, we can see that the rankings for countries’
macro CG scores and for firm-level overall CG scores were
quite stable. Singapore and Hong Kong maintained high
CG performance over the past 10 years, while Indonesia
and Philippines maintained low CG performance over the
past 10 years. Hence, our empirical findings should still be
valid for the latest market situation.
In terms of future studies, a possible research direction
is to investigate how the ownership structure of a firm
affects CG practice. La Porta et al. (1999) provided a
detailed survey about ownership structures in different
markets. Corporations in the United States and the United
Kingdom usually have a dispersed ownership structure
without a controlling shareholder. Corporations in France,
Germany, and Italy often have a pyramid ownership
structure in which the controlling shareholder indirectly
controls the corporation through his/her ownership of one
or more corporations. Moreover, corporations in Hong
Table 4 Country Macro CG Score and Market CG Score in 2001 and
2010
Country macro CG
score in 2001
Market CG
score in 2010
Singapore 7.4 67
Hong Kong 6.8 65
South Africa 5.5 n/a
India 5.4 49
Taiwan 5.3 55
South Korea 3.8 45
Thailand 3.7 55
Malaysia 3.7 52
Philippines 3.3 37
Indonesia 3.2 40
Pakistan 3.1 n/a
Country macro CG score in 2001 is obtained from Figure 25:
Country Macro Ranking in page 37 of CLSA (2001). The country
macro CG score in 2001 is the weighted average of five macro
determinants of CG, including: (i) Rules and regulations (10%), (ii)
Enforcement and regulation (30%), (iii) Political/regulatory envi-
ronment (20%), (iv) Adoption of IGAAP (20%), and (v) Institutional
mechanism and CG culture (20%). The full score is 10
Market CG score in 2010 is obtained from Figure 3: Market Category
Scores in page 7 of CLSA (2010). The market CG score in 2010 is the
simple average of five macro determinants of CG, including: (i) CG
rules and practice, (ii) Enforcement, (iii) Political and regulatory, (iv)
IGAAP, and (v) CG culture. The full score is 100
The country macro CG scores are presented in a descending order of
country macro CG scores in 2001
CLSA (2010) does not provide any CG score for South Africa and
Pakistan
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Kong and Mexico usually have a family ownership struc-
ture with a controlling shareholder. Anderson and Reeb
(2003) found that firms with a founding-family ownership
structure demonstrated significantly better performance and
argued that the family ownership structure of public firms
reduced agency problems under a well-regulated and
transparent market. This result leads us to consider the
potential relationship between CG practice and ownership
structure. Furthermore, Enriques and Volpin (2007) studied
the corporate law reforms in France, Germany, and Italy to
enhance CG practice for their firms, and these countries
usually have pyramid ownership structures. Hence, the
ownership structure of firms may be another important
determinant for the evolution of CG practice in a country.
It is worthwhile investigating this firm-specific variable,
the ownership structure, to explain CG practice across
firms.
Furthermore, this study demonstrated the significant
impact of cultural dimensions on CG practice. Future
researchers may investigate how the national culture of a
foreign manager affects the CG practice of a domestic firm,
and also investigate the optimal match between the national
culture of a foreign manager and the national culture of a
domestic firm for enhancing CG practice.
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